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The functional role of dopamine has attracted a great deal of interest ever
since it was empirically discovered that dopamine-blocking drugs could
be used to treat psychosis. Speciﬁcally, the D2 receptor and its expression
in the ventral striatum have emerged as pivotal in our understanding of
the complex role of the neuromodulator in schizophrenia, reward, and
motivation. Our departure from the ubiquitous temporal difference (TD)
modelofdopamineneuronﬁringallowsustoaccountforarangeofexper-
imental evidence suggesting that ventral striatal dopamine D2 receptor
manipulation selectively modulates motivated behavior for distal versus
proximal outcomes. Whether an internal model or the TD approach (or a
mixture)isbettersuitedtoacomprehensiveexpositionoftonicandphasic
dopamine will have important implications for our understanding of re-
ward, motivation, schizophrenia, and impulsivity. We also use the model
tohelpunitesomeoftheleadingcognitivehypothesesofdopaminefunc-
tion under a computational umbrella. We have used the model ourselves
to stimulate and focus new rounds of experimental research.
1 Introduction
Dopamine is a neuromodulator of great interest because of its central role
in reward and motivation, as well as in a number of human disorders,
including schizophrenia, attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
drug addiction, and Parkinson’s disease. The precise role of dopamine in
each of these processes is still a matter of debate, and a number of partially
overlapping hypotheses exist. With a view to formalizing and uniting some
of these hypotheses, we present a novel computational model of dopamine
function that offers a consistent account of some apparently diverse results
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from the animal behavior literature. In particular, we concentrate on the
effect of dopamine manipulation on the expression of previously acquired
behaviors.
Thereareseveralcompetinghypothesesofdopaminefunction,whichwe
brieﬂy review. Some are computational and others cognitive, with the com-
putational approaches tending to be oriented around the phasic dopamine
response and its role in learning, and the cognitive hypotheses based on
behavioral data and possibly pertaining more to the tonic or constant back-
ground signal.
The anhedonia hypothesis (Wise, 1982; Wise, Spindler, DeWit, & Ger-
ber 1978) suggested that dopamine mediates the hedonia associated with
rewardingenvironmentalstimuli.Evidencewasdrawnfromanimalexperi-
ments in which neuroleptics (dopamine-blocking drugs) caused extinction-
like effects. Extinction refers to the slow disappearance of a conditioned be-
havior if the resulting reward is not forthcoming. Recent data have eroded
the anhedonia hypothesis and supported a more subtle role for dopamine
in reward, motivation, and salience. For example, Berridge and Robinson
(2003) suggest that reward is a multidimensional construct that can be de-
composed into (among others) liking (hedonic) and wanting (motivational)
components and that dopamine selectively mediates the latter. This posi-
tionhasgainedwidespreadrecognitionastheincentivesaliencehypothesis.
Evidence is derived from an extreme experiment in which rats that are de-
prived of almost all dopamine in the ventral and neostriatum simply stop
eating, even though they apparently maintain the motoric capability to do
so and even though their life depends on the food that is right under their
noses! An analysis of affective responses when artiﬁcially fed reveals that
thehedonicimpactofthefood(”liking”)isapparentlyunaffected(Berridge
& Robinson, 1998). The incentive salience hypothesis is not computational
in nature, although McClure, Daw, and Montague (2003) have developed a
computational instantiation to account for some basic experimental data.
Salamone, Cousins, and Snyder (1997) suggest that “dopamine in the
nucleus accumbens [part of the ventral striatum] is important for respond-
ing to conditioned stimuli and ...to stimuli that are spatially and tempo-
rally distant from the organism” (p. 353). General support for the claim
that dopamine is implicated in responding for rewards (or avoiding pun-
ishments) that are in some way distal from the organism is provided by
a wide range of experiments pertaining to conditioned avoidance (Anis-
man, Irwin, Zacharko, & Tombaugh 1982; Beninger & Hahn, 1983; Black-
burn & Phillips, 1989; Courvoisier, 1956a; Grilly, Johnson, Minardo, Jacoby,
& LaRiccia, 1984; van der Heyden & Bradford, 1988; Mafﬁi, 1959; Waden-
berg, Soliman, Vanderspek, & Kapur, 2001; Stark, Bischof, & Scheich, 1999;
Wilkinson et al., 1998), animal (Richards, Sabol, & de Wit, 1999; Wade, de
Wit, & Richards, 2000; Cousins, Atherton, Turner, & Salamone, 1996; Sala-
mone et al., 1991; Salamone, Cousins, & Bucher, 1994) and human (de Wit,
Enggasser, & Richards, 2002) models of impulsivity, aphagia (Berridge &Modeling the Functional Role of Dopamine in the Ventral Striatum 363
Robinson, 1998), and instrumental responding for food (Dickinson, Smith,
& Mirenowicz, 2000; Evenden & Robbins, 1983; Fowler, LaCerra, & Etten-
berg, 1986; Rolls et al., 1974; Wise & Schwartz, 1981; Wise et al., 1978), drugs
(see Wise, 2002, for a review), conditioned reinforcers (Taylor & Robbins,
1984), and electrical brain stimulation (Ettenberg, 1989; Fibiger, Carter, &
Phillips,1976;Rollsetal.,1974;Salamone,Kurth,McCullough,Sokolowski,
& Cousins, 1993). Those studies that directly target the ventral striatum
suggest that this is the site where this particular effect of dopamine ma-
nipulation is occurring (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Cardinal, Pennicott,
Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001; Salamone et al., 1991, 1993, 1994;
Salamone, Wisniecki, Carlson, & Correa, 2001).
In contrast to these motivational perspectives, Horvitz (2002) suggests
a more attentional role for dopamine in the gating of sensory, reward, and
motor processes. Also within this attentional category, Redgrave, Prescott,
andGurney(1999)proposethatdopamineplaysaroleinswitchingbetween
different behaviors. For example, Phillips, Stuber, Helen, Wrightman, and
Carelli (2003) report that rats could be made to stop what they were do-
ing and press a lever for cocaine (a preconditioned behavior) simply by
artiﬁcially stimulating dopamine release.
From a computational perspective, a highly inﬂuential model is the pre-
diction error hypothesis of dopamine function (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996;
Houk,Adams,&Barto,1995).Electrophysiologicalrecordingsfromthepri-
matemidbrainsuggestthatthedopaminergicsignalissomewhatanalogous
to the prediction error signal used to drive learning in the temporal differ-
ence (TD) learning algorithm (for TD, see Sutton, 1988; Sutton & Barto,
1998). Apart from being able to account for a range of data pertaining to the
phasic ﬁring of dopamine neurons, one of the strengths of this hypothesis
is that it posits both a cause (error in predicted reward) and effect (update
of reward prediction) of dopamine neuron ﬁring within a concrete compu-
tational framework. However, a number of criticisms have been discussed
(Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Horvitz, 2000, 2002; Redgrave et al., 1999).
One problem for the prediction error hypothesis is that dopamine is re-
leasednotjustfollowingrewardingstimuliandstimulithatpredictreward,
butalsofollowingnovelstimuli,aversivestimuli,andevenstimulithatpre-
dict aversive events (for reviews, see Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Horvitz,
2000, 2002; Salamone et al., 1997; Joseph, Datla, & Young, 2003). Another
problem is that dopamine neurons produce not only intermittent burst or
phasic ﬁring, but also a constant background tonic ﬁring. Recently Fiorillo,
Tobler, and Schultz (2003) have also found an intermediate sustained ﬁr-
ing between a stimulus and a subsequent reward. A more general role for
dopamine is therefore suggested.
However, perhaps the major consideration is that the prediction error
hypothesis primarily posits a role for dopamine in learning (i.e., the ﬁrst
derivativeofbehavior),andyetthereiscompellingevidencethatdopamine364 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
is also required for the expression (’‘zeroth derivative”) of previously ac-
quiredbehaviors(Cousinsetal.,1996;Rollsetal.,1974;Mafﬁi,1959;Berridge
& Robinson, 1998; Wade et al., 2000; Richards et al., 1999; Wadenberg et al.,
2001). Moreover, following dopamine manipulation, behaviors appear to
be affected differently depending on their relationship to the rewarding (or
punishing) outcome. Although Montague, Dayan, Person, and Sejnowski
(1995), Montague et al., (1996), and McClure et al. (2003) have extended the
TD model to include a role for dopamine in biasing action selection, this
approach has not yet been used to account for the selectivity of dopamine
manipulation on distal versus proximal rewards. It is this selectivity that is
the focus of this letter.
A brief note on the motivation of this work is now offered. One of our
long-term goals is a better computational understanding of schizophrenia,
and in particular psychosis. Since the ventral striatum and the dopamine
D2-receptor subtype have been strongly implicated in the disorder, the ﬁrst
step was to look at behavioral studies that pertain to either the ventral stria-
tum or the speciﬁc D2-receptor manipulation, or, where possible, both. The
aim of this work is not to model the striatal D2 receptor at an anatomi-
cal or physiological level, but rather to induce its functional signiﬁcance
at the behavioral level based on the studies referred to above. Since TD
methods provide the currently preeminent computational account of pha-
sic dopamine, our ﬁrst inclination was to adopt and adapt this approach.
However, we were unsuccessful in matching the data to TD and will there-
fore outline an alternative internal model account of motivated behavior.
That is not to say that TD cannot address the data considered below, but
rather that we were unable to use it to do so in a parsimonious fashion. The
internal model approach described below and TD use very different rep-
resentational techniques with far-reaching implications, and it is important
to know which forms the sounder basis for understanding schizophrenia.
Behavioral data provide our current constraint, but future work must draw
on additional constraints (including physiological and electrophysiological
considerations) to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of behavioral, psychi-
atric, and computational communities.
2 Schizophrenia, Psychosis, and Conditioned Avoidance
Schizophrenia occurs with a global incidence of around 1% and is con-
sidered one of the most debilitating human disorders (Kandel, Schwartz,
& Jessell, 1991). The symptoms are broadly divided into two categories:
the positive and the negative. The negative symptoms, characterized by a
lack of motivation, ﬂat affect, anhedonia, eccentric behavior, social isola-
tion, poverty of speech, and a poor attention span, are chronic and effec-
tivelyuntreatablebypharmacologicalintervention.Incontrast,thepositive
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and hallucinations, often occur in acute phases and may be mitigated or
prevented with antipsychotic drugs (APDs). Although psychosis is a major
componentofschizophrenia,itmayalsooccurinnonschizophrenicindivid-
uals. For insight into the nature of delusions and hallucinations, see Maher
and Ross (1984) and Beck and Rector (2003), respectively.
All current APDs block dopamine; moreover, there is a striking correla-
tion between the ability of these drugs to block the dopamine D2 receptor
and the dose required to mitigate psychosis (Kandel et al., 1991). Interest-
ingly, all drugs of abuse cause an increase in dopamine in the nucleus ac-
cumbens(forreviews,seeDiChiara,1999;Kauer,2003;Ikemoto&Panksepp,
1999),andsomeofthese(particularlycocaineandamphetamine)canalsoin-
ducepsychoticsymptomsinusers(Bell,1973;Connell,1958).Thenumberof
D2receptorsisincreasedinthestriatumof(unmedicated)schizophreniapa-
tients in postmortem examination, an effect that is particularly pronounced
in patients with positive symptoms (Kandel et al., 1991, chap. 55). The nu-
cleus accumbens in particular may be important as a convergence site for
a number of brain regions that are implicated in schizophrenia, including
PFC, amygdala, and hippocampus (Grace, 2000), not to mention dopamine
projections of the VTA. (See also Grace, 1991, for discussion.) These, along
withotherdata,haveledtothehypothesisthatpsychosisismediated,ifnot
caused, by an excess of dopamine in the limbic system, of which the ventral
striatum is a key component (Kandel et al., 1991, chap. 55).
An important preclinical drug test for potential antipsychotic efﬁcacy is
a well-established animal experimental paradigm called conditioned avoid-
ance(CA)(Kilts,2001;Arnt,1982;Janssen,Niemegeers,&Schellekens,1965;
Wadenberg & Hicks, 1999). The standard CA experiment ﬁnds that if a neu-
tral stimulus, such as an auditory tone (the conditioned stimulus or CS),
regularly precedes an electric shock (unconditioned stimulus, or US), an
animal will learn to avoid the shock by taking appropriate evasive action
in response to the tone (Kamin, 1954; Low & Low, 1962; Black, 1963). Ap-
propriate evasive action often involves the animal’s running or jumping to
another compartment in the cage. An avoidance response is recorded if the
animal runs during the tone, and an escape response is recorded if the an-
imal waits until the arrival of the shock. A failure is recorded if the animal
fails to run even when shocked.
It is well established that low (noncataleptic) doses of all APDs, admin-
istered after the avoidance behavior has been acquired, selectively disrupt
that avoidance response yet leave the escape response intact (Ader & Clink,
1957; Arnt, 1982; Cook & Weidley, 1957; Cook & Catania, 1964; Courvoisier,
1956b; Davidson & Weidley, 1976; Ponsluns, 1962). As the drug wears off,
the avoidance response is restored (Wadenberg et al., 2001; Smith, Li, Beck-
er, & Kapur, 2004). It seems unlikely that these effects are due to the inter-
action of the drug with the learning processes of the animal because of the
differences in the timescales involved. For example, a rat typically requires
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then administered and the rat is tested 20 minutes later (allowing the drug
to take effect), the rat will stop running in response to the tone almost im-
mediately. Similarly, when the rat is tested the following day drug free, the
avoidance response will reappear almost immediately. Also, in untreated
rats, the extinction of the avoidance response when the shock is actually
discontinued tends to be a relatively slow process (Kamin, 1954). Therefore,
the immediate impact of the drug is again striking. However APDs do also
retard acquisition of the conditioned response, and dissociating the role of
dopamine in performance and learning is not straightforward (Beninger,
1989).
The degree of APD-induced avoidance disruption has been correlated
with D2-receptor blockade, leading to the suggestion that blockade of this
dopamine receptor is the neurochemical link between conditioned avoid-
ance disruption in rats and antipsychotic action in people (Wadenberg et
al., 2001). Importantly, conditioned avoidance can also be disrupted by di-
rect intra-accumbens injections of D2-receptor antagonists (blocking D2 re-
ceptors) and by accumbens 6-OHDA lesions, destroying the dopamine-
releasing neurons themselves (see Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999, for a re-
view). However, the common behavioral or psychological processes are
currently unknown. For example, existing hypotheses of why APDs dis-
rupt avoidance include the inhibition of an internal “fear” or “anxiety”
(Cook & Weidley, 1957; Miller, Murphy, & Mirsky, 1957; Davis, Capehart,
& Llewellin, 1961; Hunt, 1956), motor impairment (Ponsluns, 1962; Cook
& Catania, 1964; Morpurgo, 1965; Beninger, Mason, Phillips, & Fibiger,
1980a, 1980b; Grilly et al., 1984; Aguilar, Mari-Sanmillan, Mortant-Deusa,
& Minarro, 2000; Ogren & Archer, 1994), reduced responsiveness to ex-
ternal stimuli (Dews & Morse, 1961), decrease in sensory stimulation (Ir-
win, 1958; Key, 1961), and loss of attention or arousal (Low, Eliasson, &
Kornetsky, 1966). However, following the incentive salience hypothesis of
dopamine function, we will propose a motivational explanation that can
subsequently be used to account for additional data from other experimen-
tal paradigms.
3 The Model
Our model is based on the assumption that an animal builds an explicit
internal model of its environment. Internal models have played a signiﬁ-
cant role in the methodologies of a number of ﬁelds, including AI. Indeed,
they have been used not only within formal reinforcement learning (re-
viewed in Sutton & Barto, 1998), but also to model animal conditioning
(Schmajuk, 1988) and the dopamine system (Schmajuk, Cox, & Gray, 2001;
Suri, Bargas, & Arbib, 2001; Suri, 2001). Although the types of representa-
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Dickinson, 1995; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, &
Everitt, 2002; Dickinson, 1980), the evidence that animals internally repre-
sentaction-outcomerelationships(amongothers)iscompelling(Dickinson,
1987; Dickinson, Nicholas, & Adams, 1983). For example, Dickinson (1980)
reviews the sensory preconditioning paradigm (Nader & LeDoux, 1999; Ri-
zley & Rescorla, 1972; Talk, Gandhi, & Matzel, 2002; Young, Ahier, Upton,
Joseph, & Gray, 1998). During stage 1, a tone is paired with food. During
stage 2, the food is paired with illness. During stage 3, appetitive response
to just the tone on its own is tested. Rats trained on stages 1 and 2 show an
attenuated response in stage 3 in comparison to rats that were trained on
onlystage1.Thisdemonstratesthatratsareabletointegratetheknowledge
acquired in stages 1 and 2, and Dickinson interprets this (and other data)
as evidence for the presence of declarative representations (i.e., an internal
world model).
Our approach is a type of model-based reinforcement learning in which
anagentlearnstomaximizerewardthroughtrial-and-errorinteractionwith
its environment. This satisfactorily captures the problem faced by a real
animal. First, we assume that our model can recognize the current envi-
ronmental stimulus and the time since its onset, by activating one of a set
of predeﬁned and ﬁxed internal states. This assumption is similar to the
tapped-delay-line representation assumption of Schultz et al. (1997), Mon-
tague et al. (1996), and others. Second, these states are built into an explicit
internal model of the environment that comprises a transition function and
a reward function. Third, the internal model is used to evaluate alterna-
tive actions and generate motivation via the online calculation of expected
future reward. We will then propose a role for dopamine in modulating
the efﬁcacy of the connections between the states of the internal model,
effectively implementing an online version of the discount factor of rein-
forcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998).
Figure 1 illustrates our tapped-delay-line assumption. The temporal res-
olution at which stimuli are represented is arbitrary, and we choose an in-
terval of 1s. This interval will affect the quantitative but not the qualitative
nature of the results. The availability of states is assumed to be sufﬁcient
for each task that is considered. Each state, si, is associated with an intrin-
sic reward value, r(si), that is assumed to be supplied by the environment.
For example, a state representing shock might be assumed to elicit a reward
valueof-1,whileastaterepresentingfoodmightelicitarewardof1.Neutral
stimuli will always elicit a reward value of zero. We assume that a number
of different actions are available to the agent, A ={ a1,a2,...,am}, where m
is the total number of actions available. We also assume that the agent can
take an action only when a new environmental stimulus is presented. For
example, actions are not taken in s‘Any ,t>0.
Theinternalmodelisdescribedwithreferencetothesimpleneuralcircuit
shown in Figure 2. Each time a new internal state, snew, is activated, the368 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
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Figure1: Weassumethatthemodelisabletorecognizeandrepresentthecurrent
stimulusandthetimesinceitsonsetbyactivatingoneappropriateinternalstate
unitfromapredeﬁnedandﬁxedset,S ={ s1,...,sn},wherenisthetotalnumber
ofstates.Wewillﬁnditconvenienttoindexeachunitbyeitherastimulus-offset
pair (as in the ﬁgure) or a single generic index that uniquely labels each state.
For example, si is simply the ith state.
following procedure is performed:
1. Update reward estimate of the new state:
ˆ R(snew) := ˆ R(snew) + α
 
r(snew) − ˆ R(snew)
 
.
2. Update the transition connections:
ˆ T(sold,aold,y) :=
 
(1 − β)ˆ T(sold,aold,y) + β If y = snew,
(1 − β)ˆ T(sold,aold,y) Otherwise.
(3.1)
for all states, y ∈ S.
3. Action selection: If snew represents the onset of an external stimulus,
then select and take action, anew, as described below.
In the above, sold is the previously active state and aold is the previously
selected action. α and β are learning rates, which are arbitrarily deﬁned by
α = β = exp(−trial
100 ), where trial is the trial number. These learning rates
start at 1 and are slowly reduced to 0 across trials.
Some environmental states are marked as terminal states (see the envi-
ronmentdescriptionslater),andwhenaterminalstatetransitionoccurs,theModeling the Functional Role of Dopamine in the Ventral Striatum 369
Figure2: Theinternalmodelcanbeinterpretedusingasimpleneuralmetaphor.
Each internal state unit is connected to each other state unit under each possible
action by a unique transition connection, the strength of which is controlled
by a transition weight. For example, the transition strength, ˆ T(si,a2,sj), will be
adapted during learning to reﬂect the probability that state sj follows state si
under action a2. Note that the direction of the transition connections is from
the state-action units back to the state units. Additionally, each state maintains
an estimation of the immediate reward value associated with that state, ˆ R(s ∈
S). Although this value will be immediately available in r(s ∈ S), the former
representstheestimatelearnedbytheinternalmodel,whilethelatterrepresents
the actual value coming in from the environment. In theory, r(s ∈ S) could be
a distribution, for example, while ˆ R(s ∈ S) is always a scalar value. The reward
valuesandtransitionconnectionsareadaptedduringlearningsothatanexplicit
internal model of the environment is approximated. This model will be used to
estimate future reward and to drive motivation and action selection. From an
anatomical perspective, we speculate that the states themselves are represented
incorticalareas(possiblyincludingtheOFCandamygdala),whilethetransition
connections are routed through the ventral striatum (see the discussion).
trial is ended. Over a number of trials, the agent learns to represent an ex-
plicitinternalmodelofitsenvironmentthatconsistsofanestimatedreward
function and an estimated transition function. Step 2 just redistributes the
weights from the relevant state-action unit (see Figure 2) back to each state
unit according to a learning rate, β. All transition strengths are initialized
to 1/n, and the redistribution rule ensures that
 n
i=1 ˆ T(x,y,si) = 1 for all
x ∈ S and y ∈ A at all times.370 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
Action selection is performed by using a look-ahead process to generate
theexpectedfuturerewardofeachactioninturnandthenselectingthebest
action. The look-ahead process involves playing through the consequences
of taking each action inside the internal model. We assume that this look-
aheadcanbeperformedwithoutdisturbingthemodelingprocessdescribed
above. If actually implemented in neural circuitry, it might be necessary to
maintain two copies of the internal model: one for keeping track of the en-
vironment and one for performing look-ahead. We abstract over this detail.
We now propose a role for dopamine in modulating the efﬁcacy of the tran-
sition connections. First, let zij denote the state-action unit corresponding to
taking action j in state i. Next, let the activation of si and zij be denoted by
ξ(si) and ξ(zij) respectively. Also, let FutRew(a ∈ A) be an internal register
used for accumulating the total future reward of taking action a in current
state, snew. The action selection step is ﬂeshed out as follows:
3. Action Selection: If snew represents the onset of an external stimulus:
(a) For each action, ai ∈ A:
i. FutRew(ai) := 0
ii. For all j ∈{ 1...n}:
ξ(sj) :=
 
1I f sj = snew,
0 Otherwise.
iii. For some ﬁxed number of iterations, q:
A. Propagate activation from state units to state-
action units:
For all j ∈{ 1...n} and all k ∈{ 1...m}:
ξ(zjk) :=
 
ξ(sj) If k = i,
0 Otherwise.
B. Generate hypothetical next state:
For all j ∈{ 1...n}:
ξ(sj) :=
 n
k=1
 m
l=1 ξ(zkl) × ˆ T(sk,al,sj) × DAtonic
C. Collect rewards for this hypothetical state:
FutRew(ai) := FutRew(ai) +
 n
j=1 ξ(sj) × ˆ R(sj)
D. Return to 3(a)iiiA.
(b) Select and take action,
anew:=



argmax FutRew(a)
a∈A With prob. p,
Random action With prob. 1−p.Modeling the Functional Role of Dopamine in the Ventral Striatum 371
In the above, 0 ≤ DAtonic ≤ 1 is the level of tonic dopamine (default =
1); q is the maximum depth of the look-ahead process, which we arbitrarily
set at 50; and p controls exploration, where p = (1 + exp(5 − 0.07trial))−1.
Explorationstartsat1andisreducedto0oversuccessivetrials.Exploration
is an important part of behavior acquisition, since in general the initial
state of the internal model will not accurately reﬂect the environmental
contingencies.
The approach we have taken is very simple. Activity cycles around the
circuit of Figure 2 in order to simulate the environmental consequences of
each action in sequence. The action that accumulates the greatest future re-
wardduringthisprocessisactuallyselected,generatinganewrealsequence
of environmental stimuli. A role for DAtonic as a modulator of the transition
connections is proposed in step 3(a)iiiB. This will allow us to account for
the ﬁnding that actions motivated by distal rewards are more vulnerable
to dopamine manipulation than those motivated by proximal rewards. We
have made the simplifying assumption that during the look-ahead process,
the action currently being evaluated is always selected (step 3(a)iiiA). We
consider a more ﬂexible alternative to this look-ahead policy later, although
the qualitative nature of the results are not contingent on this feature of the
model because of the simple environments used.
Providing that DAtonic = 1, then at any stage in the look-ahead process,  n
j=1 ξ(sj) = 1. This is guaranteed by the starting condition in 3(a)ii and the
fact that
 n
j=1 ˆ T(x,y,sj) = 1 for all x ∈ S and y ∈ A. More important, the
activation of each state unit corresponds to the probability of that state in-
deedbeingthecurrentstateatthatfuturetime,underthelook-aheadpolicy.
However,forDAtonic < 1,theseactivationswilldecayduringthelook-ahead
process, although the activations will still be in proportion to these prob-
abilities. As the look-ahead process continues, FutRew(a) converges on the
estimated future reward of taking action a, modulated by the online dis-
count factor, DAtonic. Expected future reward or the return is the standard
quantity to maximize in reinforcement learning problems (Sutton & Barto,
1998; Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996). Note that the agent is naturally
parallel in design and relies mainly on local learning and activation rules.
4 Modeling Conditioned Avoidance
A prerequisite of any model of delusions or disordered thoughts is a model
of ordered thoughts. Since a model of ordered thoughts represents the holy
grail of a number of disciplines, it is as well that we have a relatively simple
yet highly relevant animal model of dopaminergic action at our disposal.
We present the model in conjunction with a generalized version of the
CA paradigm presented in Mafﬁi (1959) (reviewed with other classic APD
studiesinDews&Morse,1961).ThestandardCAﬁndingthatAPDsdisrupt
avoidance before escape is observed within Mafﬁi’s paradigm, but Mafﬁi372 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
also makes an interesting additional observation that we wish to model. He
found that after sufﬁcient training, the rats began producing the avoidance
response as soon as they were placed in the cage and before they were
even presented with the tone. He termed this response to environmental
context the secondary avoidance response, and the standard response to the
tone the primary avoidance response. He then found that not only was the
primary avoidance response more vulnerable to dopamine blockade than
the escape response itself (the standard ﬁnding), but that the secondary
avoidance response was more vulnerable than the primary response (see
Figure 5, left). Apparently, the more distal the cue from the shock, the more
vulnerable that cue was to dopamine blockade in terms of its ability to elicit
a response.
WecandescribethestandardCAenvironmentwiththeﬁnitestatemodel
of Figure 3a (left) and Mafﬁi’s experiment with Figure 3a (right). The ﬁnite
stateenvironmentsdeﬁnedinFigure3areanecessaryassumptionrequired
toformalizetheproblem,andtheyeffectivelytakeontheroleofananimal’s
environment as well as its sensory processing. These environment descrip-
tions will be different for each experiment that we consider. In contrast, the
learning rules described above are deﬁned once and represent our model of
the behavioral processes, which we believe to pertain to the ventral striatal
D2 receptor.
Figure 4(a) shows the internal model after 100 learning trials. The transi-
tionconnectionsreﬂecttheenvironmentalcontingenciesofFigure3a(right).
Thisinternalmodelcanthenbeusedtogeneratetheexpectedfuturereward
oftakingdifferentactionsineachenvironmentstate.Forexample,Figure4e
shows how activation is propagated through the internal model during the
look-ahead process of the ”do nothing” action at trial onset for DAtonic = 1
for the internal model of Figure 4c. The return is generated by summing the
reward estimates of each active unit in proportion to its activation. Setting
DAtonic < 1afteracquisitionoftheinternalmodelresultsinthedecayofthis
activationduringthelook-aheadprocess,andthereforealsotheattenuation
of the impact of increasingly distal outcomes (not shown).
Figure 5 compares expected future reward thus generated with the per-
formance of Mafﬁi’s rats. Here we are assuming that expected future re-
ward is a suitable basis for motivation. In order to convert this value into
the probabilistic behavior of the rats as shown in Figure 5 (right), a soft-
max action selection mechanism would be required in place of the  -greedy
mechanism of step 3b. Although not shown, the model acquires avoidance
behavior within a number of trials that is consistent with the amount of
experience required by an actual rat (Wadenberg et al., 2001). However, this
behavior is rather trivial, and the real point of interest is the selective effect
ofDAtonic onsecondaryavoidanceversusprimaryavoidanceversusescape.
For interest, Figures 4c and 4e give an example of the model’s behavior in
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Figure 3: (a, left) A simple and abstract environment model for the classic CA
task. Each circle represents a different environment state an agent can be in, and
the arrows denote the outcome of each of the two possible actions. The arrows
are labeled with the time between the action being taken and the transition
actually occurring. For example, if the Do Nothing action is selected when the
tone is presented, the shock will be delivered after a delay of 5 s (see Wadenberg
et al., 2001, for an experimental example). We make the simplifying assumption
that the agent must take one of the available actions on entry into a state, and
must then wait for the ensuing transition before another action may be taken.
Thenumberinsideeachstaterepresentsthereward,r,associatedwiththatstate.
The Safety state is the terminal state, which always transitions to itself, and the
trial is terminated when the ﬁrst such transition is made. Note that if the agent
selectsDoNothingintheShockstate,theshocklastsonlyfor5s,afterwhichthe
trial is automatically terminated. This is consistent with a typical experimental
setup (Wadenberg et al., 2001). (a, right) A generalized version of (left) that
represents the experimental setup of Mafﬁi (1959). (b) An abstract deﬁnition of
the environment for the discounting task of Wade et al., (2000; see section 5).
Trials begin in the left-most state.374 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
Figure 4: (a) The state of the internal model after learning the environment
of Figure 3a (right). The secondary stimulus refers to the Environment cue in
Figure 3a (right) and the primary stimulus to the Tone. All learned transition
connections, ˆ T, are shown. The relationship to Figure 2 is as follows: The units
of Figure 2 are plotted here in weight space rather than physical or anatomical
space. Also, the state-action units are removed, and the transition connections
from each of the state-action units are collapsed onto the relevant state so that
the connections from state to state can be seen more clearly. As a result of visu-
alizing the ˆ T(s,a,s ) function as a simpler ˆ T(s,s ) function, it is not possible in
this ﬁgure to know which action causes a given transition. However, the transi-
tion connections associated with taking the Run action in response to the onset
of each external stimulus always transition to the Safety unit. The remaining
transitions show the consequences of Do Nothing. (b) The state of the internal
modelafterlearningtheenvironmentofFigure3b.(c)Asinaexceptthattempo-
ral random noise is added to the identiﬁcation of the current state. The bolder
connections denote a stronger transition weight. (d) The state of the internal
model after learning the T-maze environment of Figure 8(a). (e) The propaga-
tion of activation through the internal model of c during a typical look-ahead
process for the Do Nothing action at the beginning of a trial, with DAtonic = 1.
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Figure 5: A comparison of model performance with Mafﬁi’s data. (a) Number
ofsecondaryavoidanceresponses,primaryavoidanceresponses,andescapere-
sponses under increasing doses of the neuroleptic chlorpromazine (a drug with
a particularly high afﬁnity for the D2 receptor), as a percentage of the number
of responses without the drug (adapted from Mafﬁi, 1959). (b) The change in
FutRew(Do Nothing)foreachofthethreeimportantstates(solidline=environ-
mentcue,dashedline=tone,grayline=shock)asDAtonic isdecreased.Sincewe
use DAtonic as an abstract representation of dopamine and the model does not
attempt to address the underlying neurochemical processes, the relationship
between the model parameter, DAtonic, and chlorpromazine dose is uncertain.
However,itisthequalitativenatureoftheresultsthatisofinterest,andinpartic-
ular, the selective effect of dopamine blockade on secondary avoidance versus
primary avoidance versus escape. For the comparison to be meaningful, we as-
sume that FutRew(Do Nothing) can be used as a direct analogy of motivation,
since the alternative action, Run, always yields an estimated future reward of
zero. The horizontal line suggests an example escape cost that could be used to
threshold motivation. This could explain why many studies ﬁnd that low doses
of neuroleptics disrupt avoidance but not escape.
5 Impulsivity, Delayed Rewards, and ADHD
Attentiondeﬁcit/hyperactivitydisorder(ADHD)isadevelopmentaldisor-
der affecting 3% to 7% of school-age children, characterized by inattention,
hyperactivity, and impulsivity (Frances, 2000). The single most effective
treatment for the disorder is medication with psychostimulants such as
methylphenidate (Phares, 2003). Psychostimulants (of which amphetamine
isone)areknowntoincreaseextracellularconcentrationsofdopamine(See-
man & Madras, 1998), and indeed ADHD is believed to be primarily a
dopaminergic/noradrenergic disorder (see Phares, 2003). Decreased blood
ﬂow has also been observed in the striatum of ADHD patients, a deﬁcit376 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
reversible by treatment with methylphenidate (reviewed in Schneider, Sun,
& Roeltgen, 1994). As with psychosis, striatal dopamine seems to be of im-
portance to ADHD. However, unlike psychosis, it may be a deﬁcit rather
than an excess that is to blame.
There are no laboratory tests, neurological assessments, or attentional
assessmentsthathavebeenestablishedasadiagnosticintheclinicalassess-
ment of ADHD (Frances, 2000). However, Solanto et al., (2001) have sug-
gested that a desire to avoid delay (the delay aversion hypothesis) is one of
thebestcharacterizationsofimpulsivitywithrespecttoADHD,andCatania
(in press) has argued speciﬁcally that many of the symptoms of ADHD can
beaccountedforbyassumingtoosteepadiscountinggradient.Studiessuch
as de Wit et al. (2002) have conﬁrmed that certain measures of impulsivity
are indeed reduced in healthy volunteers by amphetamine. For example,
subjects were asked questions such as, “Would you prefer ten dollars in
thirty days or two dollars at the end of the session?” The amphetamine-
treated subjects showed an increased preference for the larger but delayed
reward when compared with a placebo group.
If blocking dopamine can disrupt avoidance responding in rats, enhanc-
ing dopamine seems to decrease impulsivity as measured by this kind of
delay discounting (Wade et al., 2000; Richards et al., 1999; de Wit et al.,
2002). Furthermore, both phenomena may be mediated by the same part of
thebrain:thestriatum(seePhares,2003,formoreonstriatalinvolvementin
ADHD). However, as with psychosis, the underlying behavioral and psy-
chological processes are unclear. In a bid to better understand the role of
dopamine in impulsivity and ADHD, Richards et al. (1999) and Wade et al.
(2000) have investigated the effects of both amphetamine- and dopamine-
blocking drugs on delay discounting in rats. Their experimental paradigm
can be summarized as follows.
A thirsty rat is trained to press one of two levers. One lever yields an
immediatereward(forexample,100 µlofwater),andtheotheryieldsaﬁxed
reward(150 µlofwater)butonlyafteradelayof4s.Iftheanimalselectsthe
delayed reward, a tone is presented between the lever press and the water
to make the task easier. The immediate reward is then adjusted from trial
to trial depending on which lever the animal selected on the previous trial.
If the rat chose the immediate reward, the immediate reward is reduced
by 15%, and if the rat chose the delayed reward, the immediate reward is
increased by 15%. In this way, the immediate reward is varied until the
rat has no particular preference. The amount of immediate reward elicited
at this indifference point is then interpreted as the animal’s ”value” of the
ﬁxed, delayed reward. The rats are trained over a period of many weeks,
on a varietyof different startingconditions,until theybecomefamiliar with
and adept at exploring the two alternatives and achieving the indifference
point that suits their preference. As an additional aid, if the rat chooses the
same lever twice in a row, then the immediately following trial is a forced
exploration trial in which only the other lever yields a reward.Modeling the Functional Role of Dopamine in the Ventral Striatum 377
Figure 6: The impact of various doses of (a) a dopamine-enhancing drug (am-
phetamine) and (b) a D2-blocking drug (raclopride), on the indifference point.
The indifference point indicates the value of the delayed 150 µL alternative.
Error bars indicate SEM, and asterisks denote a signiﬁcant difference from dose
= 0. Adapted from Wade et al. (2000).
After the rats have been trained on this procedure, they are tested under
various systemic doses of both amphetamine and raclopride (dopamine D2
receptor blocker; see Figure 6). A dose-dependent effect of both drugs is
observed on the indifference point. They claim that amphetamine has effec-
tively reduced impulsivity (by increasing the value of the delayed reward),
and raclopride has increased impulsivity (by decreasing the value of the
delayed reward). Because of the incrementally adjusting procedure used,
it is impossible to rule out a learning effect completely. However, the ef-
fects of these drugs were very quick compared with the weeks of training
required for acquisition of the basic task. In the case of raclopride in partic-
ular, the lower indifference point was reached as quickly as the paradigm
allowed—after just a few trials under the drug. It therefore seems likely
that a signiﬁcant part of the change in the animals’ behavior was due to
the effect of drug on performance (rather than or in addition to its effect on
learning).
Wade et al. (2000) conclude that “this pattern of results indicates that
blocking D2-receptors may have a selective effect on the value of delayed
rewards” (p. 197). We can now use the model described in the previous
section to propose an explanation that is consistent with data from CA. Fig-
ure 4b shows the result of training the agent on the environment of Figure
3b. Acquisition is again trivial (for DAtonic = 1, the agent learns to select
the greater, delayed reward), but Figure 7 shows the effect of manipulat-
ing dopamine after acquisition. The delayed reward is discounted more in378 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
the look-ahead process as DAtonic is reduced. In order to capture the ef-
fects of both dopamine blockade and amphetamine, we assume a baseline
DAtonic < 1. The model is then able to provide a qualitative account of all
drug-induced changes in impulsivity. Note that the vertical bars shown in
Figure 7 can be moved apart (or together) by reducing (or increasing) the
temporal resolution in Figure 1, thereby modifying the steepness of dis-
counting. For reference, the largest dose of raclopride used (120 µg) would
reduce avoidance responding in CAR by around 20% (Wadenberg, Kapur,
Soliman, Jones, & Vaccarino, 2000).
Notionally, the model also captures ﬁve additional observations made
by Wade et al. (2000). First, independent of drug treatments, they vary the
delay to the ﬁxed reward (2 s and 8 s). They ﬁnd that a delay of 2 s increases
the indifference point (value of the delayed alternative) and that a delay
of 8 s decreases the indifference point. Second, they ﬁnd that the initial
amount of water on the immediate alternative does not affect the eventual
indifferencepoint.Third,theyﬁndthatthedeprivationalstateoftheanimal
(i.e., its thirst) does not affect the indifference point. In our model, a logical
role for thirst would affect the perception of the two rewards equally (i.e.,
byacommonfactor),whichcouldbeachieved,forexample,bysubstituting
step 3(a)iiiC with:
3(a)iiiC)
Collect rewards for this hypothetical state.
FutRew(ai) := FutRew(ai) +
 n
j=1 ξ(sj) × ˆ R(sj) × ”Thirst”.
This would not affect the relative indifference point. Fourth, our model
predicts that blocking dopamine should generally reduce the motivation
to press either lever, and enhancing dopamine should generally increase
the motivation to press a lever. Wade et al (2000) examined the tendencies
of the rats to complete each trial and found that raclopride reduced but
amphetamine increased the mean number of trials completed. Admittedly,
completed trials is only an informal measure of motivation. Also, in a re-
lated and recent study, J.B. Richards (personal communication, 2003) ﬁnds
that if rats are trained on a task in which levers yield immediate rewards,
but one is certain and one is uncertain, then amphetamine does not affect
the indifference point. This behavior would be produced by the model too
because uncertainty is represented by the transition connection strengths,
and dopamine has an equal effect on all such connections. A complete anal-
ysis of the model’s performance under these ﬁve conditions is outside the
scope of the account presented here.
It should be noted that Wade et al. (2000) observed the effects described
above only with dopamine D2-blocking drugs. D1 receptor blockers had no
signiﬁcant effect. Interestingly, Cardinal et al. (2001) demonstrate that ac-
cumbens(core)lesionsinratscauseexactlythesamekindsofeffects,leading
them to conclude that the accumbens is involved in the pathogenesis of im-
pulsive choice, a ﬁnding they suggest can shed light on ADHD, addiction,
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Figure 7: The effect of varying the DAtonic parameter after learning on the esti-
matedfuturerewardassociatedwitheachofthetwoactionsfromtheStartstate.
The solid curve shows the estimated future reward of pressing lever 1 (delayed
reward =140 µL), while the horizontal dashed line shows the estimated future
reward of pressing lever 2 (immediate reward = 100 µL). The gray curved line
shows the hypothetical value of the immediate reward necessary to balance the
estimated future reward of the immediate alternative with that of the delayed
alternative (i.e., the indifference point). This gray line can be used to match the
model performance with data from Wade et al. (2000). The thick vertical bar
shows the simulated level of dopamine that corresponds to the performance
of the undrugged rats in Wade et al. (2000). The vertical bars to the left show
the simulated dopamine level corresponding to the indifference point of the
amphetamine-treated rats, and the vertical bars to the right show the simulated
dopamine level corresponding to the performance of the raclopride-treated rats
(seeFigure6).Inagreementwiththeanimalstudy,themodelpredictsthatreduc-
ing DAtonic reduces the indifference point, while increasing dopamine increases
the indifference point.
also ﬁnd the same kinds of impulsive behaviour with systemic administra-
tion of amphetamine and combined D1/D2 blockers.
It has been suggested that accumbens dopamine is necessary for pro-
ducing anticipatory responses (e.g., avoidance, or lever pressing for food or
water),butnotconsummatoryresponses(e.g.,escape,orfeedingordrinking
itself)(Ikemoto&Panksepp,1999).Itisthereforenoteworthythatintheim-
pulsivity studies discussed above, two equally anticipatory responses with380 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
equal motoric requirements were dissociated by dopamine manipulation.
Therefore, arguments that rely solely either on anticipatory-consummatory
distinctions or on motor deﬁcits may need to be adjusted to address delay-
discounting paradigms.
Finally,twoimportantcaveatsareconsidered.First,incontrasttothedata
discussed above, some studies have observed that amphetamine actually
increasesimpulsivityratherthandecreasesit,leadingtothesuggestionthat
the ﬁner experimental details, such as whether a cue is presented during
the delay, may be important (Cardinal et al., 2000). Perhaps one problem is
that amphetamine injections directly into the accumbens increase general
locomotor activity (reviewed in Pennartz, Groenewegen, & Silva, 1994),
as well as an animal’s motivation to work for reinforcers (Taylor & Rob-
bins, 1984), as predicted by the internal model since expected future reward
equals motivation). Therefore, it may be difﬁcult for impulsivity studies to
separate the absolute increases in motivation due to amphetamine from the
relative decreases in choice tasks. The way in which the animal internally
models its environment is likely to play a large role. Second, it must be ac-
knowledged that ADHD is a complex and multidimensional disorder, and
the delay aversion hypothesis (see Solanto et al., 2001) and delay discount-
ing hypothesis (see Catania, in press), represent only one line of argument.
However, we conclude by contrasting our proposed role for dopamine in
gating a look-ahead process with one of the standard characterizations of
impulsivitywithinADHDofferedbyDSM-IV(emphasisourown):“Impul-
sivity may lead to accidents and to engagement in potentially dangerous
activities without consideration of possible consequences” (Frances, 2000, p. 86).
6 A T-Maze Experiment
In a fascinating study by (Cousins et al. (1996), rats were presented with a
choice between two arms of a T-maze: one leading to four food pellets, and
the other to two. However, the arm leading to four pellets was obstructed
with a barrier that had to be climbed (see Figure 8b). Once trained, the rats
chose the arm containing four pellets on almost 100% of trials. However, af-
ter bilateral intra-accumbens injections of 6-hydroxydopamine, a treatment
that destroys dopaminergic projections to the accumbens, the rats changed
their behavior, selecting the unobstructed but lesser reward instead (80% of
the time). A second experiment was then performed in which different rats
were trained (untreated, as before) on a different version of the T-maze in
which there was no reward in the unobstructed arm. Subsequent dopamine
lesionsonlyslightlyreducedrespondingfortheobstructedarm(from100%
of the time to 80%). Therefore, Cousins et al. (1996) were able to rule out
the possibility that the animals in the ﬁrst experiment were unable to cross
the barrier because of motoric deﬁcits for example. Rather, it appears that
dopamine lesions were inﬂuencing the motivational and choice processes
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Figure 8: (a) A formal environment model capturing the salient features of the
T-maze task. For simplicity we can assume negligible delays between all state
transitions. This is not a necessary assumption. (b) The T-maze experimental
setupusedinCousinsetal.(1996).(c)TheeffectofvaryingDAtonic ,afteracquisi-
tion, on the estimated future reward associated with taking the Left (solid) and
Right (dotted) actions from the Start state. The point at which the graphs cross
denotes the point at which the model will switch from seeking the obstructed
reward to seeking the easily available alternative.
The internal model can be used to capture these results by training it
on the environment of Figure 8a. Figure 4d illustrates the resulting internal
model, and Figure 8c demonstrates the effect of modulating DAtonic, after
acquisition, on the estimated future reward associated with moving left
or right from the start state. The model accounts for the change in animal
behavior from the obstructed to the unobstructed arm under dopamine
disruption. It also notionally accounts for the observation that if the rats are
trained with no food in the unobstructed arm, then they continue to select382 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
the obstructed arm, although apparently with less motivation. The model
would continue to select the obstructed arm in this case until the solid line
failed to exceed the cost of climbing the wall.
The results of this study are particularly striking because the nucleus ac-
cumbens is speciﬁcally targeted with a direct dopamine challenge, eliciting
a qualitative change in behavior. This result is not an isolated experiment
either. It is duplicated in essence in Salamone et al. (1991, 1994) with both
direct accumbens dopamine depletion and systemic D2 blockers, and Sala-
mone et al. (1997) provides a review of many other related experiments by
Salamone and colleagues that adhere to the same general pattern.
7 Instrumental Responding for Rewards
A generally accepted consequence of dopamine blockade in rats is a reduc-
tion in lever pressing (also other responses) for various types of reward
(Ettenberg, Koob, & Bloom, 1981; Evenden & Robbins, 1983; Fibiger et al.,
1976; Fowler et al., 1986; Rolls et al., 1974; Salamone et al., 1993; Wise &
Schwartz, 1981; Wise et al., 1978). Moreover, lever pressing for food or wa-
ter is often found to be reduced at doses that have little or no impact on
free feeding or free drinking where no lever press is required (Rolls et al.,
1974; Salamone et al., 1993; see Figure 9a). However, recall that Berridge
and Robinson (1998) were able to disrupt free feeding, even if the food was
under the rats’ noses, by reducing accumbens and neostriatal dopamine by
around 95%. We can use the current model to account for these ﬁndings by
assuming the environment model of Figure 9b. In order to estimate future
reward (and therefore generate motivation) for lever pressing, all three of
thetransitionsarerequired.Incontrast,freefeedingrequiresonlyApproach
and Consume, and in Berridge’s rats’ case, only the Consume transition is
required. We do not show the model’s performance on this task because of
the qualitative similarity between Figures 9a and 5a. However, it should be
evident that lever pressing is disrupted before free feeding and free feeding
before consumption in the model under the assumption of Figure 9b.
With respect to this and the T-maze experiment reviewed earlier, it is an
open question as to whether it is the “instrumental” or temporal distance
(or both) between an action and its rewarding outcome that renders that
action vulnerable to dopamine blockade.
8 Uniting Existing Hypotheses and Related Work
We have presented a computational model intended to address a corpus
of experimental data that point to a selective role for dopamine in the
expression of previously acquired behaviors. More speciﬁcally, the D2-
receptor subtype within the ventral striatum (particularly the accumbens)
has emerged as a common neuroanatomical thread throughout the stud-
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Figure 9: (a) Lever pressing for food is attenuated at neuroleptic doses that do
not drastically affect free feeding. Free drinking may be even more robust than
freefeedingtodopaminechallenge(resultsadaptedfromRollsetal.,1974).Note
that spiroperidol primarily blocks the D2 receptor. (b) An abstract environment
for instrumental responding that, in combination with the model presented,
accountsfortheselectivevulnerabilityofinstrumentalrespondingtodopamine
challenge.
through the ventral striatum is plausible, then we would expect to see this
area being activated in response to conditioned stimuli as the look-ahead
process is invoked. A number of fMRI studies in human subjects conﬁrm
this for both appetitive (Gottfried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002; O’Doherty,
Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002; O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley,
& Dolan, 2003) and aversive (Jenson et al., 2003) tasks. Also, using electro-
physiological recording techniques, Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman (2000)
havefoundavarietyofactivationsintheventralstriatumthatareconsistent
with its role in the expectation of reward across a delay.
Inadditiontotheventralstriatum,arangeoffMRI,electrophysiological,
and behavioral data points to a central role for the amygdala (Cador, Rob-
bins, & Everitt, 1989; Everitt, Morris, O’Brien, & Robbins, 1991; Everitt &
Robbins, 1989; Cardinal et al., 2002; Nishijo, Ono, & Nishijo, 1988; Robbins,
Cador, Taylor, & Everitt, 1989; Tremblay & Schultz, 2000a, 2000b) and the
orbito-frontal cortex (Arana et al., 2003; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & An-
derson, 1998; Cardinal et al., 2002; Iversen & Mishkin, 1970; Masterman &
Cummings, 1997; O’Doherty et al., 2003) in the representation of environ-
mental reward contingencies of the kind relevant to the current discussion.
It has been suggested that the OFC in particular is crucially involved in the
motivationalcontrolofgoal-directedbehavior(Schultzetal.,2000)learning
aboutrewards(Dias,Robbins,&Roberts,1996),andevaluatingalternatives384 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
(Aranaetal.,2003;Schultzetal.,2003)viaacommonneuralcurrency(Mon-
tague & Berns, 2002). We therefore speculate that the states themselves may
be represented cortically (originating presumably in the sensory cortex),
with the reward estimates, ˆ R, along with the the return being represented
in the OFC and amygdala.
The proposed model can be used to unite a number of existing cognitive
hypothesesofdopaminefunctionwithinaformalframework.Forexample,
Berridge and Robinson (1998) suggest that mesolimbic dopamine mediates
the wanting component of reward as distinct from the liking, and in our
model,followingMcClureetal.(2003),weinterpretexpectedfuturereward
as precisely this wanting. Salamone et al. (1997) suggest that “accumbens
dopamine is important for responding to stimuli that are spatially and tem-
porally distant from the organism” (p. 353). This statement precisely sum-
marizes the psychological value of dopamine in our model. Ikemoto and
Panksepp(1999)havealsonotedtherelevanceoftheproximal-distaldistinc-
tion to mesolimbic dopamine function. They argue that nucleus accumbens
dopamineisimportantforinvigoratingﬂexibleapproachresponses(distal),
as distinct from consummatory responses (proximal). With respect to our
model, and particularly section 7, it should be noted that consummatory
behaviors such as free feeding may not be disrupted with only accumbens
dopamine depletions. For example, Berridge and Robinson (1998) achieved
aphagia with both accumbens and neostriatal dopamine reduction. The
striatum may therefore be functionally differentiated, with the ventral re-
gion specializing in distal motivation (e.g., approach) and the dorsal region
in proximal motivation (e.g., consumption). Modeling this distinction must
constitute future work.
Our approach is different from the TD prediction-error hypothesis (see
Houk etal., 1995; Schultzet al., 1997; Montagueetal., 1996), whichsuggests
thatthephasicdopamineresponsesignalsthedifference(error)betweenthe
future reward predicted by the animal and the actual reward received. This
error is then used to drive the learning process in a biologically plausible
fashion (Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). In contrast, we have proposed
a role for tonic dopamine in the generation of expected future reward that
is independent of the acquisition process. The advantages of our approach
are that we can model the effect of dopamine manipulation not only on
the expression of previously acquired behaviors, but also the sensitivity
of this effect to the relationship between action (or CS), and outcome (or
US).
A weakness of our internal model is that it fails to address the role of
dopamine in the acquisition process or the phasic response of dopamine
neurons themselves. We therefore suggest that future work should be ori-
entedaroundhybridapproachesaimedatachievingamorecomprehensive
account of the neuromodulator. Toward this end, a number of discussions
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explicit internal model representations (Daw, Courville, & Touretzky, 2004;
Dayan, 2002; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Suri & Schultz, 1998; Suri et al., 2001;
Suri, 2001, 2002). However, a signiﬁcant challenge remains in bridging the
gap between models of dopamine neuron ﬁring and models of behavioral
andpsychologicalphenomenainwhichdopaminemayplayapivotalrole.It
isparticularlyimportantthatweachieveabetterunderstandingofwhether
explicitinternalmodelrepresentationsoracachedvaluefunction(asinTD)
is most appropriate for modeling the brain reward system.
To conclude this section, we speculate as to why the brain might need
DAtonic. Some suggestions include (1) constraint of the look-ahead process
via its action as an online discount factor; (2) adaptation of the trade-off be-
tweenproximalanddistalrewardsinresponsetoenvironmentcues(Wilson
& Daly, 2004) or deprivational states (Giordano et al., 2002); or (3) global
control of general motivated activity.
9 Model Predictions and Future Work
Model is only as good as the useful predictions it makes, and so we are
actively engaged in a program of experimental validation. In the account
presented above, we allowed the model to make an action choice only in re-
sponse to the onset of an external stimulus. However, within the context of
conditioned avoidance, we have also looked at the predictions made by the
model if an action can be selected in any state, including the internal timing
states. These novel model-driven predictions were subsequently validated
with experimental data (Smith et al., 2004), leading us to argue against the
preeminent motor deﬁcit hypothesis (Aguilar et al., 2000; Ogren & Archer,
1994) in favor of a motivational hypothesis of APD-induced avoidance dis-
ruption in rats. We are looking for interactions of dopamine manipulation
with CS-US interval within CA, with a view to further testing the internal
model account of motivated behavior.
One of the primary motivations for undertaking this work is to create
a computational dopamine hypothesis that can be used to shed light on
schizophrenia.Wearguethatmanyofthenegativesymptomsofschizophre-
nia can be notionally captured by reducing DAtonic, including reduced mo-
tivation, ﬂat affect, and anhedonia (given the suggestion that many of the
rewards of life may actually be conditioned stimuli; Wise, (2002). Grace
(1991) and Moore, West, and Grace (1999) have argued that a tonically
hypo-dopaminergic state may be a key step to the development of psy-
chosis, with the latter perceived as a hypersensitivity to phasic dopamine
caused as result of homeostasis to the former. With respect to modeling
psychosis, we suggest that an aberrant dopamine signal could lead to the
construction or modulation of an aberrant internal model, and an aberrant
internal model seems to be an excellent starting place to model delusions.
Further research into combining a phasic (learning) role for dopamine with
the internal model would be expected to ﬂesh out this hypothesis.386 A. Smith, S. Becker, and S. Kapur
Onemodelassumptiondeservesabriefrevisit.Weenforcedaverysimple
policy in the look-ahead process (step 3(a)iiiA), in which the current action
being evaluated was always selected at each subsequent hypothetical state.
This approach was simple and adequate given the way in which the prob-
lems were formulated. However, a more general and ﬂexible look-ahead
process would search different possible actions as one might in a game of
chess,forexample.However,sinceabranchingsearchprocessispotentially
costly, an alternative is to represent a Q-value at each state-action unit and
then use this value to guide the search process during look-ahead. Such a
value could be constructed using either a TD or Monte Carlo method (see
Sutton & Barton, 1998). This would allow the agent to trade off the beneﬁts
of being able to explicitly simulate the consequences of actions (using the
internal model) against the efﬁciency of simply using a precalculated value
(an action-value function). The former is particularly important for being
able to modulate behavior after acquisition based on an internal drive (e.g.,
salt deprivation) that was not present during conditioning. Berridge and
Schulkin (1989) have demonstrated just such an ability in animals. There
are already open lines of investigation into when and where internal model
versus TD-like value functions inﬂuence motivated behavior (Dayan, 2002;
Dayan & Balleine, 2002). However, using an action-value function to guide
the online look-ahead process does not have a direct impact on the current
discussion of dopamine function, which is kept as simple as possible.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that an internal model approach
is able to account for a range of experimental evidence that suggests that
ventral striatal dopamine D2-receptor manipulation selectively modulates
motivated behavior for distal versus proximal outcomes. Whether an in-
ternal model or the cached values of the TD algorithm are better placed
to model both a tonic and phasic dopamine response in this brain region is
likelytohaveimportantimplicationsforunderstandinganumberofhuman
disorders, including schizophrenia and ADHD.
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